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FEMINIST THEORY AND THE WAR ON TERROR 
by Rachael Lorna Johnstone* 
ABSTRACT 
The contemporary threat of international terrorism has prompted states and scholars to reassess 
the public/private divide as it manifests in international law with particular regard to the 
principles of state responsibility. Much of the counter-terrorism debate reflects the feminist 
literature on international law published over the last two decades. This paper exposes striking 
similarities between the counter-terrorism arguments and those of feminist scholars. In both 
cases, the classical dichotomy between public and private spheres is challenged and states are 
called to be accountable for the unlawful conduct of non-state actors. Nonetheless, the 
public/private dichotomy remains at the heart of counter-terrorism strategies as well as the 
broader regimes of international law. Examples discussed in the conclusion include the non-
recognition of “enemy combatants” as state organs or agents; privatization of military and non-
military operations during the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq; the privatization of gender 
discrimination in state (re-)building; and reinforcement of gender stereotypes and women’s 
private roles in the “War on Terror.” While the proponents of counter-terrorism leverage 
arguments against the public-private dichotomy in their favor, the similarities between the two 
positions end where the anti-terrorist position ultimately returns to the dichotomy and reinforces 
it in order to uphold state interests, effectively turning its back on women’s rights. 
 
 
                                               
* Rachael Lorna Johnstone is Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Akureyri, Iceland where she has been 
based since 2003. She has studied at the University of Glasgow (LL.B. (Hons), 1999), the European Academy of 
Legal Theory, Brussels (LL.M., 2000) and the University of Toronto (S.J.D., 2004). She would like to thank 
Margrét Henreksdóttir, Kenneth Dorter, Garrett Barden and Giorgio Baruchello for comments on earlier drafts of 
this paper. All errors are the author’s own. 
©  
9 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 2 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 
INTRODUCTION 3 
PART 1: THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE 4 
The Public/Private Divide in International Law 4 
State Responsibility and the ILC Articles 7 
PART 2: FEMINIST CRITIQUES 9 
Distinguishing Wife-Beaters and Those Who Harbor Them 9 
Competing Strategies 12 
Responses and Ongoing Challenges 14 
PART 3: THE “WAR ON TERROR” 17 
International Terrorism 17 
The United Nations Security Council 18 
Counter-Terrorism Scholarship 25 
Opinio Iuris of the United States 32 
State Practice: Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) 33 
PART 4: UNLIKELY BEDFELLOWS, DANGEROUS BEDFELLOWS 39 
The Public/Private Divide Lives On 39 
“Enemy Combatants” 40 
Private Contractors in Combat and Quasi-Combat Operations 41 
Private Contractors in Reconstruction and Privatization of Services 42 
The (Private) Place of Women 43 
Masculinity and the “War on Terror” 44 
Final Words 45 
©  
 9 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 3
UNLIKELY BEDFELLOWS: 





The contemporary threat of international terrorism has prompted states and scholars to 
reassess the public/private divide as it manifests in international law with particular regard to the 
principles of state responsibility. Without acknowledging the intellectual debt, much of the 
debate mirrors the concerns expressed by feminist theorists of international law in the 1990s. 
This paper explores similarities between some of the feminist literature and the counter-terrorism 
arguments in international law. The argument concludes that despite overlapping values in these 
two bodies of discourse there is no cause for optimism among feminists; the challenge to the 
public/private divide from the terrorism threat is unlikely to provide any relief to the most 
vulnerable of the world’s women and, to the contrary, the public/private divide remains essential 
to both counter-terrorism strategies and the wider agendas of Western governments within the 
international system.  
 Part One briefly introduces the public/private divide and its place in international law. In 
Part Two, the feminist critiques of the public/private divide, from the 1990s to the present day, 
will be explored. Part Three examines post 9/11 challenges to the public/private divide in 
counter-terrorism literature and practice. Part Four provides examples illustrating that the 
public/private divide remains alive and well and is essential to the “War on Terror” at the 
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PART 1: THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE 
 
The Public/Private Divide in International Law 
 
Neither the dichotomy between public and private nor feminist concerns with the same 
require introduction to scholars of international law or feminist legal theory. The separation 
between public and private spheres lies at the heart of the liberal theory of the state and has been 
adopted into classical international law theory, no more so than in the International Law 
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility (ILC Articles).1 Within the domestic realm, the 
public sphere is associated with political participation, macroeconomics and criminal justice.2 
The private sphere, by contrast, contains paradigmatically the family, as well as microeconomics, 
market trade, “private law” and employment.3  
In practice, when trying to allocate aspects of daily life to public or private spheres, the 
dichotomy quickly collapses. Education of children would historically be considered a private 
matter, something either inside the family or contracted out to a private school system.4 In 
modern liberal democracies, education is provided directly by the state and even where private or 
home-schooling are options, education remains rigorously monitored.5 Private law may apply in 
                                               
1 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 
(2001) [hereinafter ILC Articles].  
2 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, 62-63, 89-90 (David Spitz, ed., W.W. Norton & Co., New York: 1975) (1859).  
3 Id. at 88 (on micro-economics and market trade), 91-92 (on employment), 94-96 (private law), 97-100 (the family), 
and 103-04 (micro-economics and market trade).  
4 Id. at 97-100.  
5 E.g., In England and Wales, it is a criminal offense to operate a school without registering with the state and all 
schools are subject to regular inspections: Education Act, c. 32 (Eng. & Wal.) §§ 157-171 (2002) (especially, § 159). 
©  
 9 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 5
relationships between private individuals, but it can only exist at all because the state creates the 
rules and staffs the courts in which those rules are adjudicated. 
The assignment of life’s experiences to public or private sectors entails an element of 
choice, but a sphere is public to the extent that the governing authorities of the state are active in 
its regulation or provision. A sphere remains private if the state remains uninvolved. Malcolm 
Evans explains: “the private sphere is only the private sphere because the State has not yet 
intruded into it.”6 For this reason, certain aspects of life, such as healthcare, that are considered 
public in one state may be considered private in another. Such differences arise even between 
states that are ostensibly similar in political, economic and social bases.7  
Despite its fluidity, the separation of the public and private has proven conceptually 
powerful and has become entrenched in the systems of international law.8 This entrenchment 
manifests itself at two levels. First, the state that is recognized in international law is largely 
composed of the institutions that the state recognizes as public under its internal order.9 The actor 
in international law, the creator of international legal norms and subject of state responsibility is 
                                                                                                                                                       
Parents opting to teach their children at home must also make formal agreements with their local education authority 
and meet various requirements: School Standards and Framework Act, c. 31 (Eng. & Wal.) §§ 110-111 (1998).  
6 Malcolm D. Evans, State Responsibility and the European Convention on Human Rights: Role and Realm, in 
ISSUES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 139, 159 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice 
& Dan Sarooshi, eds., 2004); see also Nicola Lacey, Theory into Practice? Pornography and the Public/Private 
Dichotomy? 20 J.L. & SOC’Y 93, 96 (1993) (noting that a decision not to regulate is equally a political decision). 
7 E.g., Healthcare is publicly funded and operated in the United Kingdom and Canada, with a small private sector. In 
the United States, a similar common-law, English-speaking developed market economy, healthcare is 
overwhelmingly a matter of private insurance and private provision with the state taking a minimal supplementary 
interest in the most needy.  
8 Doris Buss, Austerlitz and International Law: A Feminist Reading at the Boundaries, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES  87, 94 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji, eds., 2005).  
9 ILC Articles, supra note 1, art. 4. It is theoretically possible to have organs or agents that are not defined by the 
internal order under the second paragraph of the article, but as explained by the commentaries to the article and 
confirmed in the Genocide Convention case, it is rare in practice; see, Case Concerning the Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 
reprinted in 46 I.L.M. 85, para. 393 (2007) (Feb. 26) [hereinafter Genocide Convention case]. 
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the state, self-defined. The distinction between state and non-state actors is fundamental to 
international law; “private actions are not in principle attributable to the state.”10 
Second, international law traditionally has permitted the public/private divide to be 
reflected in a separation between international and domestic spheres. Wholly internal (private) 
affairs are matters of domestic jurisdiction and hence of no interest to international law.11 Just as 
the pater familias closes the door on his private family, shielding it from public scrutiny, so the 
state closes its gates to international scrutiny of its domestic affairs.12 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks 
describes this idea: “Until quite recently, international law viewed the state as a black box into 
which international law could not see – and did not wish to see.”13 
The post-war development of international human rights law has brought challenges to 
this Westphalian model, bringing domestic affairs into the spotlight of international law.14 
However, even within human rights law, the state reigns supreme. The state is the creator of 
international human rights law; it must consent to uphold human rights norms by virtue of treaty 
or acceptance of customary law.15 Furthermore, the distinction between public and private 
remains entrenched in human rights law to the extent that only states can be held accountable for 
violations, and state and non-state breaches of human rights law are treated quite differently 
within the discipline.16 
 
                                               
10 ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESSES: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 153 (1994). Higgins 
goes on to note exceptions which will be discussed infra text accompanying notes 16-27.  
11 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Feminist Justice, at Home and Abroad: Feminism and International Law: An 
Opportunity for Transformation, 14 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 345, 348 (2002).  
12 Shelley Wright, Economic Rights, Social Justice and the State: A Feminist Reappraisal, in RECONCEIVING 
REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 117, 128-9 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, ed., 1993).  
13 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 11.  
14 Id. at 348-49.  
15 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2nd. Ed., 153-155 (2005).  
16 States may be held accountable for private violations of human rights, but only on the basis of their failure to 
exercise due diligence to protect; the violation is therefore a separate delict (lack of due diligence) and not 
responsibility for the private violation per se.  
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State Responsibility in the ILC Articles 
 
The distinction between public and private is reified in the ILC Articles, the second 
reading of which was finalized in 2001.17 Responsibility of states depends upon the identification 
of a state actor; responsibility for non-state violations of international law is regarded as quite 
exceptional. Articles 4, 5 and 8 identify actors for whom state responsibility is engaged.18 Article 
4 refers to state organs, de iure or de facto, and article 8 refers to agents-actors who would 
normally be considered private but for the fact that they are acting under the direct control or 
following explicit instructions of a state organ identified in  article 4.19 Article 5 allows state 
responsibility for private actors who are authorized to undertake “governmental” functions on 
behalf of the state.20 The articles read: 
Article 4 
Conduct of organs of a State 
 
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under 
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other 
functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its 
character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the State.  
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the 





                                               
17 ILC Articles, supra note 1. 
18 Id., arts. 4, 5 & 8.  
19 Id., arts. 4 & 8.  
20 Id., art. 5.  
21 Id., art. 4.  
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Article 5 
Conduct of persons or entities exercising elements 
of governmental authority 
 
The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 but 
which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental 
authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law, provided the 
person or entity is acting in that capacity in that particular instance.22  
Article 8 
Conduct directed or controlled by a State 
 
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, 
or under the direction and control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.23  
 
Although, under article 4(2) the internal law’s categorization of an entity as “public” or 
“private” is not definitive, the identification of a state organ de facto is highly exceptional and 
requires a relationship of “complete dependence” or the absence of “any real autonomy.”24 
Article 5 requires that the state specifically confer upon the entity the “state” (governmental) 
function and the actions of the para-statal entity are attributable only to the extent that they are 
indeed taken in the exercise of the governmental function.25 The definition of “governmental” is 
inconclusive and ILC recognizes in the commentaries that this is a contextual standard. It is, as 
the ILC concludes, “a narrow category.”26 Under article 8, for the state to take responsibility for 
the conduct of private actors that it “directs or controls” requires a very high degree of control,  
                                               
22 Id., art. 5.  
23 Id., art. 8.  
24 Genocide Convention case, 46 I.L.M. 85, para. 393 (2007) (Feb. 26), at paras. 393-94; see also Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J.14, 110 (June 27) [hereinafter 
Nicaragua]. 
25 ILC Articles, supra note 1, art. 5.  
26 ILC Articles, supra note 1, commentary to art. 5, paras 6 & 7.  
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namely “effective control,” which can rarely be established absent explicit instructions, followed 
precisely, or direct, specific control over each wrongful act.27 
 
PART 2: FEMINIST CRITIQUES 
 
Distinguishing Wife-Beaters and Those Who Harbor Them 
 
The leading, early feminist assault on the public/private divide in international law is 
found in Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright’s seminal 1991 article, Feminist Approaches to 
International Law.28 The arguments in this article triggered a wealth of scholarship in which 
feminists remain actively engaged to the present day.29 Within this body of academia, an ongoing 
tension arises between the desire to deconstruct the public/private divide altogether by 
demonstrating its vacuousness and a more pragmatic agenda that entails strategically and perhaps 
even skeptically accepting the divide, but demanding the inclusion of women’s concerns in 
public spaces.30  
Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright’s famous article brought a feminist light to a number 
of areas of international law including colonialism and decolonization; the exclusion of women 
de facto in international organizations and as the creators of international law; the patriarchal 
                                               
27 Genocide Convention case, 46 I.L.M. 85, para. 393 (2007) (Feb. 26), at para. 400. For a more detailed analysis, 
see Rachael Lorna Johnstone, State Responsibility: A Concerto for Court, Council & Committee, 37(1) DENVER J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 63 at 64-75 (2008). 
28 Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 613 (1991).  
29 See, e.g. INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES, supra note 8; RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 12; WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THE WAY FORWARD 
(Rebecca Cook, ed., 1994); Brooks, supra note 11; Anne Orford, Feminism, Imperialism and the Mission of 
International Law, 71 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 275 (2002).  
30 See, Buss, supra note 8, especially at 96-99; Karen Engle, After the Collapse of the Public/Private Distinction: 
Strategizing Women’s Rights, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 12, at 
143-144.  
©  
 9 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 10 
premises behind the concept of the state; the state-centric basis of international law; and the 
presumed irrelevance of women’s lives and experiences.31 They pointed to the marginalization of 
women’s rights and weaker enforcement mechanisms for the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women compared to other human rights treaties and the 
tolerance of far-reaching reservations to the former Convention.32 They criticized the focus on 
rights, in particular civil and political rights, sometimes enjoyed at the expense of women, and on 
criteria of self-determination that ignore the participation or lack of participation by women in 
the identification of the “self” to be determined.33 As interesting as these arguments are, this 
article will focus primarily on the feminist critique of the public/private dichotomy, as this 
critique is mirrored by counter-terrorism discourses. In counter-terrorism strategies, nonetheless, 
as this article will show, while the public/private dichotomy breaks down on the one hand with 
regard to state responsibility, it is simultaneously upheld on the other, with significant and costly 
repercussions for women.34  
Charlesworth et al., recognized that the precise boundaries of what constitutes public and 
private vary between different cultures.35 Nonetheless, a common feature was that whenever 
there was a private sphere, women were found there.36 However, in areas considered public, 
women were missing, invisible, or few in number.37 This division of public and private spheres, 
emerging from the Western Liberal tradition, was now entrenched in international law.38 Not 
                                               
31 Charlesworth, et al., supra note 28, at 621-22. 
32 Id. at 631-33; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 
1249 U.N.T.S. 13. 
33 Charlesworth, et al., supra note 28, 621-22, 625 & 634-38; see also, Hilary Charlesworth, Alienating Oscar? 
Feminist Analysis of International Law, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 
12, at 126.  
34 Charlesworth, et al., supra note 28, at 625-30. 
35 Id. at 626. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 627. 
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only are the spheres separate, but the private sphere and the women within it are regarded as less 
important.39 Moreover, “a universal pattern of identifying women's activities as private, and thus 
of lesser value, can be detected.”40 The classical principles of state responsibility assume that 
only acts of state give rise to human rights violations. Harms that occur in private might be 
unwelcome, but they are not matters of human rights or a fortiori international law.41  
Charlesworth later expands on the public/private dichotomy in human rights law, arguing 
that it is implicit in the separation of “generations” of rights and the preference for civil and 
political rights (liberal rights) to economic, social, cultural, and group rights.42 Wright illustrates 
the extent to which the public and private spheres exist in a symbiotic relationship where one 
cannot exist without the other and each defines the other.43  
Chinkin’s review of the drafting of the ILC articles is critical of the unquestioning 
assumption of a genuine distinction between public and private conduct.44 Attribution of activity 
to the state depends on the character of the actor, not the character of the action. Although there 
is scope for exception, the identification of an actor as an organ of state is almost exclusively 
defined by the state’s internal law.45 Chinkin expresses disappointment that expansion of the 
notion of due diligence, particularly in human rights law, has not been taken into account in the 
ILC Articles, recognizing that “non-regulation of the market is itself an expression of political 
preference.”46 She suggests parallel policy choices in domestic and family issues.47  
                                               
39 Id. at 626-27. 
40 Id. at 626.  
41 Id. at 627.  
42 Hilary Charlesworth, What are “Women’s International Human Rights?” in WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW: THE WAY FORWARD, supra note 29, at 58, 71-76; see also Celina Romany, State Responsibility Goes 
Private: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, 85. 
43 Wright, supra note 12, at 120-23. See also, Christine Chinkin, A Critique of the Public/ Private Dimension, 10 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 387, 389 (1999). 
44 Chinkin, supra note 43, at 387-89.  
45 Id. at 388; see also supra text accompanying note 24.  
46 Chinkin, supra note 43, at 392. 
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The tensions amongst feminist scholars, even within the programs of each individual 
feminist scholar, become apparent when they attempt to work with the critique in order to make 
international law more relevant to women’s lives.48 The most significant of these, alluded to 
above, is about whether or not to work within the existing scheme for incremental improvements. 
In other words, the feminist critique questions whether it is better to accept the public/private 
dichotomy at face value but demand that women’s concerns be included in the public; or whether 
to decry the dichotomy altogether and dismantle the architecture of liberal theory and 
international law.49 
Rebecca Cook takes a pragmatic approach in her work on women’s human rights.50 
Rather than seeking a radical overhaul of the entire international human rights system—because 
that may risk significant short-term losses in human rights protection for women and men 
alike—she speaks in a language that international law can hear.51 She argues that the principles 
of state responsibility be understood with a greater reflection on women’s experiences, in 
particular, by expanding state responsibility for omissions.52  
                                                                                                                                                       
47 Id. at 395.  
48 Christine Chinkin, Gender Inequality and International Human Rights Law, in INEQUALITY, GLOBALIZATION, 
AND WORLD POLITICS  95, 121 (Andrew Hurrell & Ngaire Woods, eds., 1999); HILARY CHARLESWORTH & 
CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 59-61 (2000). 
49 Doris Buss introduces the concept of “architecture” to explain the conceptual separation of public and private 
spaces in international law: Buss, supra note 8.  
50 Rebecca Cook, State Accountability Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, in WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THE WAY FORWARD, supra note 29, at 228 
[hereinafter Cook, State Accountability); Rebecca Cook, Accountability in International Law for Violations of 
Women’s Rights by Non-State Actors, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 
12 at 93 [hereinafter Cook, Accountability in International Law]. 
51 Cook, State Accountability, supra note 50, especially at 237. 
52 Id.; see also Cook, Accountability in International Law, supra note 50. See also, Kenneth Roth, Domestic 
Violence as an International Human Rights Issue, in WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THE WAY 
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Cook cites the Janes Arbitration case as evidence of the distinction “in principle and in 
practice” between state responsibility for acts and omissions.53 The case states that “[e]ven if 
non-punishment of a murderer really amounted to complicity in the murder, still it is not 
permissible to treat this… as just as serious as if the Government had perpetrated the killing with 
its own hands.”54 
Charlesworth and Chinkin contest this assumption at the heart of international law. 
Charlesworth argues: “if violence against women is understood, not just as aberrant behavior, but 
as part of the structure of the universal subordination of women, it can never be considered a 
purely “private” issue.”55 Chinkin adds: “Why should the state only be responsible for the 
internationally wrongful acts of state organs? The state claims jurisdiction over the totality of 
functions within its territorial control; it might therefore be appropriate to assert its responsibility 
for all wrongful acts emanating from it, or from nationals subject to its jurisdiction.”56 Together, 
they argue: “There is no reason why the maintenance of a legal and social system in which 
violence against women is endemic and accepted should not engage state responsibility directly, 
whether or not women are treated differently from men in this respect.”57  
Domestic violence is defined according to the liberal tradition by its occurrence in the 
private sphere because it is “domestic” as opposed to public.58 It does not matter whether it 
occurs literally behind closed doors, in a dark alleyway or in a crowded public bar. The fact that 
                                                                                                                                                       
FORWARD, supra note 42, at 326, (arguing that direct state responsibility for private violations of human rights risks 
destabilizing the whole system of human rights protection and undoing the moral, social and political gains in the 
field because a number of groups could claim to be systematically oppressed and he fears dilution of the power of 
human rights language). 
53 Cook, Accountability in International Law, supra note 50, at 98.  
54 Janes v United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 82 (1951). See also TAL BECKER, TERRORISM AND THE STATE: 
RETHINKING THE RULES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY, 17-23 (2006).  
55 Charlesworth, supra note 42, at 73. 
56 Chinkin, supra note 43, at 395.  
57 CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 48, at 149. 
58 Charlesworth, et al., supra note 28, at 628-29.  
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it occurs between two people who are intimately acquainted renders the behavior domestic and 
thus private.59 By contrast, it is not considered “domestic violence,” or even a private matter, 
when two work colleagues engage in a similar interaction, regardless of the length of time they 
have worked together and the apparent depth of their personal relationship with one another.60 It 
is not the location of the abuse that defines abuse as public or private rather it is the way that the 
relationship between the perpetrator and victim are perceived. If it is not a familial relationship, 
it is not private.61  
 
Responses and Ongoing Challenges 
 
Feminist Approaches to International Law triggered a number of responses, including 
those among feminists sympathetic to the broader purpose of women’s inclusion in international 
law.62 These responses led to the more enriched and subtle critique that is prevalent today. There 
were two principal feminist replies to the public/private dichotomy as outlined in the 1991 article 
and both of these were swiftly taken into account in the authors’ later work.63 The first was a 
response of feminists from developing and non-Western countries to a perceived “essentialism” 
in the early work; women everywhere might be subject to patriarchy, but its manifestations were 
                                               
59 Id. at 627. 
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 See, e.g., Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses in 
THIRD WORLD WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM 51 (Chandra Talpade Mohanty, et al., eds., 1991); Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, To Bellow Like a Cow: Women, Ethnicity, and the Discourse of Rights, in WOMEN’S 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: THE WAY FORWARD, supra note 29, at 39; Diane Otto, Rethinking the 
“Universality” of Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1997/98); Engle, supra note 30; Lacey, 
supra note 6; Buss, supra note 8. 
63 CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 48; Charlesworth, supra note 42; Chinkin, supra note 43; Chinkin, supra 
note 48; Christine Chinkin, Feminist Interventions into International Law, 19 ADELAIDE L. REV. 13, 20 (1997); 
Wright, supra note 12. 
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not everywhere the same.64 In some cases, first-world women are, if not complicit, at least the 
beneficiaries of a patriarchal and exploitative relationship between their countries and 
developing countries, which contributes to human and gender inequality. Further “women in 
developing countries” are not a homogenous group with shared concerns and interests. It is 
unhelpful for Western feminists to make sweeping assumptions about what is in their interests. 
Fundamentally, the rights strategy that fits well in Western liberal democracies as a language that 
institutions can understand may not fit well in other societies.65 The second challenge came from 
feminists concerned that scholars were by their work reifying the public/private dichotomy.66 
Moreover, by associating all things “female” with the private, they were trapping women within 
it.67 They were accused of falling into the easy habit of assuming that all women’s interests were 
by definition in the private sphere.68 A related argument is that in some cases, the private sphere 
provides a refuge, a place of protection and freedom, for women.69 
  In their 2000 text, The Boundaries of International Law, Charlesworth and Chinkin 
demonstrate a more nuanced appreciation of the diversity of women’s experiences.70 They 
recognize that the allocation of human activity to public or private is not universal, but varies 
between societies.71 Further, they accept Coomaraswamy’s reflections that the state should not 
always be considered as a “Scandinavian” protector of its citizens.72 They acknowledge the 
potential of the private sphere as a site of liberation and freedom for women.73 However, the 
                                               
64 Mohanty, supra note 62, Coomaraswamy, supra note 62, Otto, supra note 62. 
65 Mohanty, supra note 62, Coomaraswamy, supra note 62, Otto, supra note 62. 
66 Engle, supra note 30, at 146-148; Lacey, supra note 6, at 100-101; Buss, supra note 8.  
67 Id. 
68 Engle, supra note 30, at 146-148; Lacey, supra note 6, at 100-101; Buss, supra note 8.  
69 Engle, supra note 30, at 148-9; see also, Lacey, supra note 6, at 100. For a practical example, see Peter Beaumont, 
Iran’s Young Women Find Private Path to Freedom, THE OBSERVER (London), Mar. 16, 2008, at 42.  
70 CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 48. 
71 Id. at 56-59, especially at 58.  
72 Id. at 165. 
73 Id. at 57. 
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basic argument is the same; the public/private dichotomy is still thriving in international legal 
theory. Despite advances in human rights law with respect to states’ positive duties to protect, 
violations of the rights of women are still not taken as seriously as those of men.74 Moreover, the 
preference for civil and political rights reflects men’s experiences of the need for protection 
against the state. Charlesworth and Chinkin consider the right to life, largely understood as 
requiring protection against state threats, but not against the risk of being conceived female.75 
Despite some frustration with the lack of changes and the maintenance of the architecture 
of international law with its stubborn even if illusory boundaries, the pragmatic approach of 
working within that architecture has shown some successes. The notion of positive duties has 
made considerable advancement within human rights law, and the human rights treaty bodies 
have taken on a more gender balanced perspective.76 Chinkin’s 1997 concern that there was 
“greater resistance” to the expansion of state liability for lack of due diligence to prevent private 
abuses against women has perhaps by now been overcome, at least in the human rights treaty 
bodies.77  
Although there remains a need to question artificial constructs that entrench inequality, 
the individual gains achieved by working within the system should also be celebrated. These 
                                               
74 E.g., the norm against racial discrimination is ius cogens; the prohibition of discrimination against women, by 
contrast, is not. The prohibition of torture is likewise ius cogens; but torture is defined so as to encompass only 
abuse in the public sphere, omitting psychological and physical abuse perpetrated against women within their 
personal relationships, regardless of the gravity of the abuse. ILC Articles, supra note 1, commentary to art. 26, 
para. 5; CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, id, at 16-17, 136-37 & 234-35.  
75 CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 48, at 233-34. 
76 Rachael Lorna Johnstone, Feminist Influences on the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 28 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 148 (2006); but see Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human Rights 
in the United Nations, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2005) (arguing that gender mainstreaming at the United Nations has 
been largely superficial yet made it harder to address questions about entrenched gender inequality). 
77 Christine Chinkin, Feminist Interventions into International Law, supra note 63, at 20. 
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short-term victories are crucial for the women whose lives are affected and whose lives may 
even be saved.78  
 




The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11), and perhaps even more 
significantly, the perceived need for a military response, have complicated traditional 
assumptions about state responsibility for the actions of non-state terrorists in ways reminiscent 
of the feminist discourse examined in Part Two above. Similar to the feminist scholarship, one 
can see two main shifts of perspective in the area. One works within the classical framework 
with a greater focus on the positive obligations of states to prevent terrorism and a higher degree 
of due diligence.79 The other questions the entire basis of the public/private dichotomy, insists 
that terrorists cannot be distinguished from the states in which they are permitted to operate, and 
that state responsibility for terrorist activities should be direct.80 These positions are not always 
clearly demarcated.  
Despite thirteen treaties with global reach, a number of regional treaties, United Nations 
Security Council (the Council) resolutions and decades of experience, agreement on a precise 
                                               
78 Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 11, 13, at 355; Chinkin, Feminist Interventions into International Law, supra note 
63, 77, at 20; Chinkin, supra note 48, at 121; Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: an Essay for Robert Cover, 96 
YALE L.J. 1860, 1920 (1986);  CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 48, at 212.  
79 E.g., Vincent Joël Proulx, Babysitting Terrorists: Should States be Strictly Liable for Failing to Prevent 
Transborder Attacks?, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 615 (2005); Derek Jinks, State Responsibility for the Acts of Private 
Armed Groups, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 83 (2003). 
80 E.g., BECKER, supra note 54; Greg Travalio & John Altenburg, Terrorism, State Responsibility and the Use of 
Military Force, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 97, especially 100-111 (2003). 
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definition of terrorism remains elusive.81 This paper will exclude instances of terrorist-like 
activities at the hands of state organs or agents (as defined by ILC articles 4 and 8) as these do 
not raise interesting questions about the public/private dichotomy.82 The focus instead will be on 
what is being said about state responsibility for terrorism when the actors are quite evidently not 
organs or agents within the definitions of the ILC Articles.  
  
The United Nations Security Council 
 
Since 2001, the Council has made a number of resolutions pertaining to terrorism and 
introduced new duties upon states to take measures to prevent terrorism.83 The Council has done 
so, however, while maintaining an ambiguous stance as to the form of state responsibility for 
non-state cross-border terrorist activities.84 On September 12, 2001, this ambiguity was almost 
certainly intentional, as it was not yet known who was behind the previous day’s attacks, and 
further investigation may have uncovered direct links to a state or several states. In Resolution 
                                               
81 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sep. 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizures of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sep. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including 
Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 
Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, 1456 
U.N.T.S. 124; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil 
Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304; Convention on the 
Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 721 (1991); International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 17, 1997 37 I.L.M. 249 (1998); International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000); International 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Apr. 13, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 815 (2005).  
82 ILC Articles, supra note 1, arts. 4 & 8.  
83 SC Res. 1368 (Sep. 12, 2001); SC. Res. 1373 (Sep. 28, 2001); SC Res. 1390 (Jan. 16, 2002); SC Res. 1452 (Dec. 
20, 2002); SC Res. 1455 (Jan. 17, 2003); SC. Res. 1456 (Jan. 20, 2003); SC Res. 1526 (Jan. 30, 2004); SC Res. 
1530 (March 11, 2004); SC Res. 1535 (March 26, 2005); SC Res. 1540 (April 28, 2004); SC Res. 1566 (Oct. 8, 
2004); SC Res. 1611 (July 7, 2005); SC Res. 1617 (July 29, 2005); SC. Res. 1624 (Sep. 14, 2005); SC. Res. 1735 
(Dec. 22, 2006). 
84 For a more detailed analysis of state responsibility in these resolutions, see Johnstone, supra note 27. 
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1368, the Council condemns the attacks on the United States and regards them “like any act of 
international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security.”85  
States have long been required to abstain from supporting non-state terrorists. 
Traditionally, if a state’s links to terrorists are not adequate to establish the terrorists as organs or 
agents of the state (i.e. they are short of complete dependence or effective control), the attacks 
will not be attributable to the state and the state will not have committed an “armed attack.”86 
However, support or encouragement of such action will, at the very least, constitute an unlawful 
infringement of the sovereignty of the victim state and at most “indirect aggression.”87 But the 
Council in Resolution 1368 suggests the possibility of more direct accountability, stressing that: 
“those responsible for aiding, supporting, or harboring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors 
of these acts will be held accountable.”88 It is not clear for what exactly harboring states will be 
held accountable, whether directly for the terrorist attacks themselves or instead only for the 
states’ actions (or omissions) in “aiding, supporting or harboring.” In addition, the word “those” 
is sufficiently vague to refer either to states or to non-state actors, intended to be held 
accountable by states in domestic criminal process. The French text provides no additional 
insight.89 
                                               
85 SC Res. 1368 supra note 83, Preamble. This is not the first time that acts of terrorism were considered as threats 
to international peace and security by the Council; see S.C. Res. 748 (Mar. 31, 1992) (Libya); S.C. Res. 1054 (Apr. 
26, 1996);  S.C. Res. 1070 (Aug. 16, 1996) (Sudan); S.C. Res. 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); S.C. Res. 1333 (Dec. 19, 2000) 
(Afghanistan).  
86 ILC Articles, supra note 1, arts. 4 & 8.  
87 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; see also S.C. Res. 748, supra note 85, at 6th preambular paragraph; Declaration on 
the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970) 1st principle, 
para. 6 [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration]; Corfu Channel (U.K. v Albania) I.C.J. 1949, at 18 [hereinafter 
Corfu Channel]; Nicaragua, at para. 195.  
88 S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 83, at operative para. 3.  
89 “[Q]ue ceux qui portent la responasabilité d’aider, soutenir et héberger les auteurs, organisateurs et 
commanditaires de ces actes devront rendre des comptes.” [ED.“Those who bear responsibility for aiding, 
supporting, or lodging individuals who carry out, organize, or direct these acts shall be held accountable.”] 
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In the shadow of the preparation for the invasion of Afghanistan by the United States and 
its allies, a little over two weeks later the Council passed Resolution 1373.90 In the preamble, the 
“inherent right of individual or collective self-defense” is again recognized, but there is neither 
direct reference to, nor explicit approval of, the invasion.91 Afghanistan is not named as 
responsible for the preceding attacks.92 There are at least two possible explanations for the two 
resolutions’ silence on the matter, and both may contain some truth. The meeting lasted only 
long enough for the resolution to be passed with all discussions having clearly taken place 
beforehand; therefore the reasoning behind the members’ agreement must remain the subject of 
speculation.93 Some Council members may have been wary of an explicit authorization of the 
invasion because it may, in their view, have necessitated recognition of Afghan responsibility of 
the attacks. This view would have extended state responsibility well beyond the classical 
limitations of responsibility only for organs and agents. On the other hand, the coalition partners 
on the Council may have wished to leave the door open to armed self-defense against other states 
where they believed terrorists were enjoying shelter without the need for further Council 
negotiation and agreement.94  
The main focus of Resolution 1373 has nothing to do with the right of self-defense, but 
introduces requirements on all member states of the United Nations to take extensive measures to 
prevent terrorism, in particular, to limit terrorist financing.95 The Council’s authority to pass such 
                                               
90 S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 83.  
91 Id. at 4th preambular paragraph.  
92 Id. 
93 U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4385 (Sep. 28, 2001).  
94 This latter is hinted at in Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of 
America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2001/946 (notifying the Council 
of the United States’ invocation of the right of self-defense against Afghanistan at the launch of Operation Enduring 
Freedom).  
95 S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 83.  
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“legislative” measures has been the subject of some debate.96 However, that need will not 
prevent us from considering the Council’s implicit view of state responsibility for terrorist 
activities. 
States are first instructed to take measures to prevent terrorist funding.97 Likewise, “[a]ll 
states shall” desist from supporting terrorists, suppress terrorist recruitment and transfers of 
arms.98 They should share information with other states that might be targeted for attack and 
deny refuge to terrorists and those involved in terrorism.99 States shall prevent terrorist 
operations in their territories, have and apply criminal law against terrorists and share 
intelligence information to enable this, and limit the mobility of terrorists.100 States are “called 
upon” (a non-binding form of words ) to share information and cooperate in criminal justice, 
prevent abuse of their asylum and refugee systems by terrorists, and consider ratification of 
counter-terrorism conventions, in particular, the Terrorism Financing Convention.101 The 
Council then “[n]otes with concern” links between terrorism and other international crimes, such 
as trafficking and money laundering and asks that states cooperate to reduce these activities.102 
                                               
96 E.g., Paul C Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 901 (2002); Jose Alvarez, 
Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 874 (2003); Matthew Happold, Security Council 
Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United Nations, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 593 (2003); Eric Rosand, Security 
Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight Against Terrorism, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 
333, 334 (2003); Roberto Lavalle, A Novel, if Awkward, Exercise in International Law Making: Security Council 
Resolution 1540, 51 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 411 (2004); Gilbert Guillaume, Terrorism and International Law, 53 INT’L 
& COMP. L.Q. 537 (2004); Eric Rosand, The Security Council as “Global Legislator”: Ultra Vires or Ultra 
Innovative, 28(3) FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 542 (2005); TARCISIO GAZZINI, THE CHANGING RULES ON THE USE OF FORCE 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-14 (2005); Andrea Bianchi, Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s 
Anti-terrorism Measures: The Quest for Legitimacy and Cohesion, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 881 (2007); Rachael Lorna 
Johnstone, International Martial Law: The Security Council’s “Legislative” Response to Terrorism, 2 
LÖGFRÆÐINGUR 81 (2008). See also, Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, On the Security Council’s <<law-making>> 83(3) 
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 609 (2000) (expressing concern about the Council’s law-making prior to 
9/11). 
97 S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 90, at operative para. 1.  
98 Id. at operative para. 2(a); cf. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 87, at 1st principle.  
99 Id. at operative para. 2. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at operative para. 3; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra note 
81.  
102 S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 90, at operative para. 4.  
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Similar concerns were the subject of Resolution 1269 in 1999.103 Therefore Resolution 
1373 might be considered a logical extension of the former resolution.104 However, the earlier 
resolution is a non-binding Chapter VI resolution which only “calls upon” states to action.105 
Resolution 1373 instead purports to bind states and creates more specific obligations.106  
The obligations introduced by Resolution 1373 are obligations of conduct, not obligations 
of result.107 States are required to take a number of steps, some rather specific under the shadow 
of a thinly veiled threat of forcible measures should they fail to comply.108 However, according 
to this resolution, the activities of non-state terrorists in their territories are not to be 
automatically attributed to the host state. Liability is for failure to comply with the resolution, not 
for any resulting terrorist activities or terrorist financing. Therefore, if a state fully complies with 
the resolution, that state will engage no liability, even if a cross-border terrorist attack takes 
place, as the state will not have committed any “wrongful act.” Similarly, a state will be in 
breach of the resolution if it fails to take these measures, even if there are no direct consequences 
for another state. The question of responsibility for compliance or non-compliance with the 
resolution is quite distinct from the actions of terrorists.109 
                                               
103 S.C. Res. 1269 (Oct. 19, 1999). 
104 PETER J VAN KRIEKEN, TERRORISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 144 (2002).  
105 Id. 
106 S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 83. 
107 For a discussion of the distinction and its potential for confusion, see Pierre Marie Dupuy, Reviewing the 
Difficulties of Codification: On Ago’s Classification of Obligations of Means and Obligations of Result in Relation 
to State Responsibility, 10(2) EUR. J. INT’L L. 371 (1999); see also James Crawford, Second Report on State 
Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/498 23-39, paras. 52-92, especially paras. 88-92 (providing a similar explanation 
and arguing (successfully as it later transpired) for the removal from the second reading of the distinction on the 
basis that the distinction is not binary, but rather a matter of degree (para. 79) and that it is, moreover, a matter of 
primary rules). 
108 S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 90, at operative para. 8.  
109 See Roberto Ago, Second Report on State Responsibility: The Origins of International Responsibility (1970) 2 
Y.B. INT’L L. COMMISSION., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1970/Add.1, 177, 194-5 paras. 50-54. Damage will be 
relevant to the availability of remedies, in particular, in identifying an “injured State” in light of ILC Articles, supra 
note 1, at arts. 42 & 48.  
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In 2004, the Council passed Resolution 1540 which obliged states to take certain 
measures to prevent the development or proliferation of biological, chemical or nuclear 
weapons.110 Unlike Resolution 1373, to which only Cuba openly objected, the Council’s 
authority to pass such broad measures came under greater constitutional scrutiny.111  
Resolution 1566 provides an interesting account of the Council’s view of states’ 
contemporary obligations to prevent terrorism. In it, the Council: 
calls upon States to cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism, especially with those 
States where or against whose citizens terrorist acts are committed, in accordance with 
their obligations under international law, in order to find, deny safe haven and bring to 
justice, on the basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute, any person who supports, 
facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the financing, planning, preparation 
or commission of terrorist acts or provides safe havens.112  
As indicated above, there is no direct and unambiguous view of state responsibility for 
terrorism made explicit in these resolutions. The need for unanimity, at least between the 
permanent members and politically desirable amongst all fifteen, has precluded such 
elucidation.113  
The duty to desist from terrorism, even indirectly such as through financing or arming 
terrorists, is a central part of the customary and Charter law that states must not interfere with 
one another’s sovereignty.114 This negative obligation to refrain from action remains unchanged. 
State responsibility will depend upon the identification of a state organ or agent who has 
                                               
110 S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 83.  
111 U.N. GAOR 56th Sess., 13th mtg, at 14, 16, U.N. Doc. A/56/PV.13 (Oct. 2, 2001); Lavalle, supra note 96, at 
426-28.  
112 S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 83, para 3.  
113 U.N. CHARTER, art. 27.  
114 See supra note 87 and corresponding text.  
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provided support. However, the state will be responsible to the extent of its support, not for the 
resulting acts of terrorism.  
States also have a positive duty to take measures to prevent terrorism, a duty of due 
diligence that is at least as old as the United Nations and defined by the Court in Corfu Channel, 
as one of: “certain general and well defined principled, namely… every State’s obligation not to 
allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”115 Should 
States fail to take adequate measures, Ago explains: 
the Government of that State will be accused of having failed to fulfil its international 
obligations with respect to vigilance, protection and control, or having failed in its 
specific duty not to tolerate the preparation on its territory of actions which are directed 
against a foreign Government or might endanger the latter’s security and so on.116  
An interpretation of the Security Council’s resolutions within the classical view of state 
responsibility would indicate that the degree of diligence due to prevent terrorism has been 
considerably expanded, particularly by Resolutions 1373 and 1540. This indicates a change in 
the primary rules without posing a challenge to the traditional view of state responsibility per se. 
As such, it is comparable to Cook’s approach of expanding positive obligations of states to 
protect individuals, particularly women, from “private” violations of human rights.117 Should the 
state fail to meet the standards required by the resolutions, the state will be responsible, not for 
the terrorist attacks (or private human rights violations) but for the separate delict of its failure to 
protect. “[T]hese alleged cases of State responsibility for the acts of individuals are really cases 
                                               
115 Corfu Channel, supra note 87, at 22.  
116 Roberto Ago, Fourth Report on State Responsibility: The Internationally Wrongful Act of a State, Source of 
International Responsibility (1972) 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMMISSION., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/264 and Add.1, 70, 120, para. 
135.  
117 See, supra, text accompanying notes 50-54.  
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of responsibility of the State for omissions by its organs: the State is responsible for having failed 
to take appropriate measures to prevent or punish the individual’s act.”118  
It is possible, however, that Resolution 1368 be interpreted as indicating a direct 
accountability for terrorist acts that a state has failed to prevent even in the absence of the organ 
or agency tests being met. Such an interpretation would indicate a more radical dispensation with 
the public/private dichotomy, in line with Charlesworth’s and Chinkin’s approach to private 
violations of women’s rights.119 This approach would be plausible if one takes the view that the 
right of self-defense exists only against an “armed attack” (itself uncontroversial) and that only 
states can commit armed attacks (more controversial).120 However, the uncertainty as to the 
identity of the perpetrators of the attacks when this resolution was passed makes this 




Scholars have likewise questioned the public/private dichotomy in light of state 
responsibility for terrorism.121 Travalio and Altenburg make the case that state responsibility for 
                                               
118 Ago, supra note 109, at 199, para. 35. 
119 See, supra text accompanying notes 34-47 & 55-61. 
120 U.N. CHARTER art. 51. For a summary of the debate, see BECKER, supra note 54, at 158-162. See also, Antonio 
Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993, 
995-998 (2001); Giorgio Gaja, In What Sense was There an “Armed Attack?” EUR. J. INT’L L. DISCUSSION FORUM: 
THE ATTACK ON THE WORLD TRADE CENTER: LEGAL RESPONSES, available at http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ny-
gaja.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2007); and Iain Scobbie, Words my Mother Never Taught Me: “In Defense of the 
International Court” 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 76 (2005), (all arguing that state responsibility is a sine qua non of an 
“armed attack”). They are supported by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua, see note 24 and Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 43 I.L.M. 1009 (2004). But see, 
Thomas Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 839, 840 (2001); Ruth Wedgwood, The 
ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence and the Limits of Self-Defense, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 52, 57-59 
(2005); Joining Becker uncomfortably on the fence is CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF 
FORCE, 164-167 (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2004); see also Christine Gray, The Use of Force and the 
International Legal Order, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, 589 (2nd ed., Malcolm D Evans, ed., 2006). 
121 Travalio & Altenberg, supra note 80; Vincent Jöel Proulx, supra note 79; BECKER, supra note 54. 
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terrorism exists when there are links meeting a much lower threshold than that held in Nicaragua 
or the Iran Hostages cases.122 They argue, essentially, that contemporary international terrorism 
creates unique threats, and as a matter of necessity, this justifies a lex specialis in the secondary 
rules of state responsibility in order to allow for state self-protection.123 They cite Oscar 
Schachter (famously “alienated” by the Australian feminists’ attack on the public/private 
dichotomy124) in support of blurred boundaries with reference to terrorism: “When a Government 
provides weapons, technical advice, transportation, aid and encouragement to terrorists on a 
substantial scale it is not unreasonable to conclude that the armed attack is imputable to that 
government.”125  
Travalio and Altenburg argue not only that the law of state responsibility ought to evolve 
to allow states to protect themselves against major terrorist threats, but also that it has already so 
evolved, citing in support the opinio iuris of the United States considered above and, more 
importantly, the absence of express objections to that state’s position by other members of the 
international community.126 They argue that this new doctrine of state responsibility for 
terrorism, requiring as it does a much lower threshold of “support” in order for the state to be 
held accountable, has been tacitly accepted and is now customary international law.127 They 
conclude:  
                                               
122 Greg Travalio & John Altenburg, supra note 80, especially at 100-111 (2003). But see Genocide Convention 
case, supra note 9, at para. 385-407 reiterating the Nicaragua standard, Nicaragua, see note 24.  
123 Travalio & Altenburg, supra note80, 112-13.  
124 Charlesworth, Alienating Oscar, supra note 33.  
125 Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 80, 106; but see Genocide Convention case, supra note 9, para. 401: “The rules 
for attributing alleged internationally wrongful conduct to a State do not vary with the nature of the wrongful act in 
question in the absence of a clearly expressed lex specialis.” The secondary rules of state responsibility for terrorism 
are anything but “clearly expressed” so we must assume that the Court’s position is that the ILC Articles apply 
equally to terrorism as they do to genocide. 
126 Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 122, at 109. 
127 Id. 
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the standard for state responsibility is one of sanctuary or support, and it has been 
accepted by the world community. The pronouncements of the United Nations over the 
past three decades that states have a responsibility under international law to refrain 
from supporting or harboring terrorists have been transformed into a principle of state 
accountability for the acts of terrorists. Once a state makes it clear that it is uninterested 
in eliminating a terrorist threat emanating from its soil, it has assumed responsibility for 
the actions of the terrorists, and has opened itself to the lawful use of force by the 
threatened state.128 
Vincent-Joël Proulx claims that post 9/11, the Nicaragua and ?????? tests for state 
responsibility have been abandoned, at least with respect to terrorism.129 Although he agrees that 
the United States’ administration has collapsed the distinction between direct and indirect 
responsibility — between responsibility for actions and omissions — he does not agree with 
Travalio and Altenburg that this is the contemporary state of international law.130 Instead, 
according to Proulx, the better view is one in line with that of Rebecca Cook, where there 
remains a distinction between direct responsibility (for organs and agents who fail to respect 
international law) and indirect responsibility (for the failure of due diligence to prevent non-state 
violations of international law).131 However, indirect responsibility is now taken much more 
seriously, just as Cook would like to see with regard to women’s human rights.132 The 
international responses to the attacks of 9/11 have led to a: “monumental shift in international 
law from direct to indirect state responsibility. Indirect responsibility is no longer a second-best 
                                               
128 Id. at 111. 
129 Proulx, supra note 79????? ????????????????????????, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal on Jurisdiction, paras. 98-145  
(July 15, 1999) [hereinafter ?????]; Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J.14, 110 (June 27).  
130 Proulx, supra note 79. 
131 Id. at 637; Cook discussed supra text accompanying notes 50-54.  
132 Proulx, supra note 79 at 637; Cook discussed supra text accompanying notes 50-54. 
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when direct responsibility cannot be established; rather, it has supplanted direct responsibility as 
the dominant theme in the field of attribution.”133 He claims that indirect responsibility is just as 
serious as direct responsibility when terrorist attacks occur: “[A] state’s passiveness or 
indifference toward terrorist agendas within its own territory might trigger its responsibility, 
possibly on the same scale as though it had actively participated in the planning.”134 
However, Proulx remains dissatisfied with indirect responsibility for terrorism and an 
expansion of positive obligations, given the fundamental objectives of “saving lives and 
protecting citizens.”135 Instead, he prescriptively argues that the rules of attribution should be 
circumvented altogether in favor of a form of “strict liability” for terrorism.136 He mitigates this 
slightly by introducing a possible defense for states whose territory is used by terrorists to 
prepare attacks, allowing them to exclude their liability should they successfully demonstrate 
that they have exercised due diligence to prevent the attacks.137 His answer then is not so much 
strict liability, but rather a rebuttable presumption of responsibility followed by a shift in the 
burden of proof. 
  Tal Becker provides the deepest and most nuanced analysis of state responsibility for 
terrorism in his 2006 book Terrorism and the State.138 Like the feminists before him, he 
recognizes that the distinction between positive and negative responsibility, between 
acquiescence and the failure of due diligence, is not easy to maintain in practice.139 Becker’s 
view is that neither a simple strict liability approach, nor a weak approach that allows states to 
excuse their inaction by claiming good faith are adequate models to respond to the contemporary 
                                               
133 Proulx, supra note 79, at 637. 
134 Id. 624. 
135 Id. at 653; but see infra note 218, on the considerably greater threat to life by virtue of being conceived female.  
136 Proulx, supra note 129, at 643-659.  
137 Id. at 656-57. Due diligence is an obligation of conduct, not an obligation of result.  
138 BECKER, supra note 54. 
139 Id. at 132. 
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terrorist threat.140 He explains the positive responsibilities on states to prevent terrorism as 
underlined by due diligence at two levels. States must first “pursue and acquire” territorial 
control and adequate administrative apparatuses; secondly, they must employ those 
capabilities.141 States would accordingly engage liability for a “separate delict” should they fail 
on either of these counts.142  
Unpersuaded by the adequacy of this due diligence model, Becker argues for a looser 
regime for attribution of responsibility. He suggests that states which have suitable counter-
terrorism organs in place, but operate them only formally and without vigor should be held 
directly accountable for any resulting terrorist attacks. In Becker’s view, their failure is 
tantamount to acquiescence and as such, is a violation of the negative duty to abstain from 
terrorist activities.143 States who have instead not acquiesced, but nevertheless fail to exercise 
due diligence remain responsible by virtue of failing to meet their positive obligations to prevent 
(a separate delict).144 Finally, a state of limited capacity that does its utmost but still fails to 
prevent a terrorist attack will not be in violation of the due diligence standard and will not bear 
any responsibility.145 Becker’s model shifts the focus from the need to establish an organ or 
agency relationship between state and perpetrator to a focus on the wrongful act with causation 
as the basis of responsibility.146 Becker’s argument is prescriptive, but he also defends it as 
potentially descriptive, with an examination of recent state practice in response to terrorist 
attacks.147 His position is that this causation theory of state responsibility may be lex specialis 
                                               
140 Id. at 143-44.  
141 Id. at 146; see also, Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International 
Responsibility of States, 35 GERMAN YB INT’L L. 9, 25-26.  
142 BECKER, supra note 54, at 146.  
143 BECKER, supra note 54, at 151. 
144 Id. 
145  Id. 
146 Id. at 156; 331-360.  
147 Id. at 186-206. 
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pertaining to terrorism, or alternatively, a general basis of state responsibility for private acts in 
international law.148 The latter argument would, of course, have major implications in 
international human rights law, in particular with regard to private violations of women’s rights. 
The state would bear direct responsibility for private wrongs, instead of only indirect 
responsibility pivoting on the due diligence standard. 
Becker makes a number of statements that are reminiscent of the radical feminist 
writings:  
The agency paradigm not only neglects the subtle relationships between the private and 
public sphere in the perpetration of acts of terrorism, it encourages [acts of terrorism].149 
Persistent State failure to prevent wrongs within the private domain can be as much a 
form of State policy as direct governmental action. But by conceiving of responsibility 
through the prism of the public/private distinction this method of State action can be 
concealed. The result is to shield the functioning State from direct responsibility when its 
wrongful conduct was a direct cause of the private harm.150  
Because the State is subject to a detailed duty to prevent terrorism, its failure to regulate 
terrorist conduct in the private domain, when it has the capacity to do so, can be a form 
of State participation in the private wrong. This is not because the State necessarily 
controls the private conduct as principal in an agency relationship or because it is 
complicitous in the criminal sense, but rather because it is the State’s unlawful failures 
that have made possible the very private terrorist activity that it is charged to forestall. 
In an international system in which only the State enjoys widespread monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force, it cannot be indifferent to the illicit use of force by private 
                                               
148 Id. at, 359-360.  
149 Id. at 259. 
150 Id. at 274. 
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actors which it is obligated to prevent and then claim that its responsibility is limited to 
the conduct of its own agents. The very monopoly over force in international affairs 
makes the State, at least potentially, a direct participant in the private violence that is 
acts or omissions wrongfully allow.151 
To Becker’s credit, he is the only one of the scholars discussed here who recognizes the 
links with earlier feminist approaches. However, despite quoting Chinkin and Romany, he does 
not explore these links in any depth or examine any of the responses by “mainstream” 
international lawyers to the feminist approach as they might be applied to his own argument.152  
Derek Jinks considers changes in state practice and opinio iuris following 9/11 and 
concludes that these may indicate a change in the secondary rules of state responsibility, 
suggesting that “the emergent rule arguably reconfigures the distinction between public and 
private conduct.”153 He cautions against acceptance of such a change, instead arguing that 
terrorism is best countered by increasing states’ obligations through stronger primary rules,  
requiring states to take greater measures to prevent terrorism.154 As such, his position is 






                                               
151 Id. at 281-82. 
152 Id. at 273-74. For an early response to the radical feminist arguments, see Fernando R. Téson, Feminism and 
International Law: A Reply, 33 VA. J. INT’L L  647 (1993).  
153 Jinks, supra note 79, at 90. 
154 Id. 
155 Cook discussed supra text accompanying notes 50-54. 
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Opinio Iuris of the United States 
 
The United States’ administration in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 shared the “radical 
feminist” position, evidenced by the famous statement of the president on September 11 that 
“We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who 
harbor them.”156 The president expanded upon this later the same month, stating:  
By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is committing murder . . . Every 
nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are 
with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support 
terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”157  
In November 2001, he continued: “If you harbor terrorists, you are terrorists. If you train or arm 
a terrorist, you are a terrorist. If you feed a terrorist or fund a terrorist, you’re a terrorist, and you 
will be held accountable by the United States and our friends.”158  
The president’s position was echoed on the floor of the Security Council, with the 
American representative similarly stating: “We will make no distinction between the terrorists 





                                               
156 George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, Address to the Nation (Sep. 11. 2001), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html. 
157 George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the 
American People (Sep. 20, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.  
158 George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, Remarks to Troops and Families at Fort Campbell, 
Kentucky (Nov. 21, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011121-3.html. 
159 U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at 7-8 U.N. Doc. S/PV.4370 (Sep. 12, 2001). 
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State Practice: Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) 
 
Within a few weeks of 9/11, the United States and a coalition of allies had begun an 
aerial campaign against Afghanistan and later sent in ground troops in order to root out the 
terrorists behind the attacks of 9/11.160 The Taliban, as the self-declared and de facto but largely 
unrecognized government of Afghanistan, had been given the option of avoiding invasion by 
surrendering Bin Laden and other purported terrorists; releasing all detained foreign nationals; 
protecting journalists, diplomats and aid workers; closing all terrorist training camps; and giving 
unrestricted access to the terrorist training camps to allow verification that they were all beyond 
use.161 To no-one’s surprise, the Taliban rejected these demands, instead responding that they 
would try Bin Laden in Afghanistan and asking the United States to provide evidence of his 
involvement in the attacks.162 This counter-offer was likewise rejected.163 Military action 
commenced shortly afterwards, aimed, according to the United States, “at the Taleban [sic.] 
rather than the Afghan people.”164 Days after the commencement of aerial bombing, the Taliban 
offered to surrender Bin Laden to a neutral third country for trial. This offer was similarly 
unsatisfactory to the United States.165  
                                               
160 For a summary of events leading up to the military action, see, Contemporary Practice of the United States 
Relating to International Law: Legal Regulation of Use of Force, 96 AM. J. INT’L. L. 237 (Sean D. Murphy, ed., 
2002). On the process of the campaign and legal analysis of the same from 2001-2004, see GRAY, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 120, at 164-172.  
161 President of the United States of America, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 
supra note 157. See also, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: Legal 
Regulation of Use of Force, supra note 160, at 243-44; GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE, supra 
note 120, at 159.  
162 Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: Legal Regulation of Use of Force, 
supra note 160, at 244. 
163 Nic Robertson and Kelly Wallace, U.S. rejects Taleban Offer to Try bin Laden, CNN.COM (Oct. 7, 2001) 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/10/07/ret.us.taliban/index.html. 
164 Id. 
165 Bush Rejects Taliban Offer to Hand Bin Laden Over, THE GUARDIAN (on-line edition) (London) (Oct. 14, 2001), 
at  http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/14/afghanistan.terrorism5, Contemporary Practice of the United 
States Relating to International Law: Legal Regulation of Use of Force, supra note 160, at 248.  
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In line with Article 51 of the Charter, the actions taken in “self-defense” against 
Afghanistan were duly notified to the Security Council. After briefly describing the attacks, the 
United States informed the Security Council of its possession of “clear and compelling 
information that the Al-Qaeda organization, which is supported by the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan, had a central role in the attacks” and that the attacks and the ongoing threat “posed 
by the Al-Qaeda organization have been made possible by the decision of the Taliban regime to 
allow the parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by this organization as a base of 
operation.”166 The military self-defense operations were aimed at “Al-Qaeda terrorist training 
camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.”167 
The letter from the United Kingdom similarly referred to “information” indicating Al-
Qaeda’s responsibility for the attacks and claimed their military operations were “directed 
against Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and the Taliban regime that is 
supporting it.”168 The following day, the United Kingdom presented a further letter outlining the 
basis of the claim that Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda were behind the 9/11 attacks. That letter 
concluded: “[t]he attack could not have occurred without the alliance between the Taleban [sic.] 
and Osama Bin Laden, which allowed Bin Laden to operate freely in Afghanistan, promoting, 
planning and executing terrorist activity.”169 The theme of an “alliance” or even a “close 
alliance” between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda is the main predicate for the justification of military 
action against the Taliban’s own institutions.170 However, even accepting the United Kingdom’s 
conclusions as presented to the Security Council in the absence of the supporting evidence — 
                                               
166 Letter S/2001/946, supra note 94.  
167 Id. 
168 Letter from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (Oct. 7, 2001) S/2001/947, p. 11, 
para. 70. 
169 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the 
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, (Oct. 8, 2001) S/2001/949.  
170 Id. at paras. 10-19. 
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which was withheld from the Security Council owing to the “need to protect intelligence 
sources”171 — the United Kingdom did not argue that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are synonymous 
or that the organs of the Taliban coordinated the 9/11 attacks and pose an ongoing threat. At best, 
the United Kingdom attempted to portray a relationship in line with much of the “overall 
control” test of the ??????case,172 but to the extent that the relationship is portrayed as one of 
mutual support and shared objectives, it is likewise one of mutual independence. One cannot 
readily characterize it as one of “control”; neither does the Taliban exercise any control over Al-
Qaeda, nor Al-Qaeda over organs of the Taliban.  
It is important to recall here the widely held pre 9/11 view on the legality of self-defense 
under Article 51: 
[a]ny state that seeks to invoke the right of self-defense should be required to furnish the 
international community with credible evidence that it has suffered an attack, that the 
entity against which the right of self-defense is exercised was the source of that attack, 
that the attack or threat of attack is continuing, and that the use of force is necessary to 
protect the state from further injury.173  
Ignoring Charney’s concerns that sufficient evidence was not in fact presented to the 
Security Council to prove Al-Qaeda’s responsibility, two more pressing questions remain.174 The 
first is whether the definition of armed attack — and thus legitimacy of measures taken in self-
defense — still pivots on the Definition of Aggression from the Nicaragua case, namely, 
“sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which 
carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to acts of 
                                               
171 Id. at para 3. 
172 Tadi?? Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal on Jurisdiction, at paras. 98-145. 
173 Jonathan I Charney, The Use of Force Against Terrorism in International Law, 95 AM J. INT’L L. 835, 836 
(2001). 
174 Id. at 836. 
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aggression.”175 The text “armed attack” of Article 51 is inconclusive; however, state practice and 
opinio iuris suggest that attribution of responsibility to a state was a prerequisite for legal 
intervention in the territory of a sovereign host state, at least prior to 9/11.176 The second 
question is whether the military actions were lawful against the Taliban rather than against Al-
Qaeda itself. None of the states involved in the coalition in Afghanistan ever suggested that the 
Taliban was directly behind the attacks; rather its “support” for Al-Qaeda was enough to justify 
military action against its own institutions.177 Becker explains: “Operation Enduring Freedom 
was explicitly justified on the contentious claim that the act of harboring terrorists is legally 
indistinguishable from the actual perpetration of the terrorist acts.”178  
The incursions into Afghanistan were not aimed solely at the terrorists as authors of the 
attacks, but equally at the de facto government, the Taliban.179 The United States and its allies 
intentionally overthrew that regime. Links between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda go beyond the 
merely territorial, but nonetheless are a far cry from the threshold of complete dependence or 
effective control applied in the Nicaragua Judgment and recently reiterated in the Genocide 
Convention Case.180 They do not even come close to the criteria of “overall control” of the ??????
decision, a test that has now been discredited by the International Court of Justice.181  
                                               
175 Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J.14, 110 (June 27), at para. 195; see also, GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF 
FORCE, supra note 120, at 165. 
176 See supra note 120 for commentary on this point. See also Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Law after the Destruction of 
the Twin Towers, EUR. J. INT’L L. DISCUSSION FORUM: THE ATTACK ON THE WORLD TRADE CENTER: LEGAL 
RESPONSES, available at http://www.ejil.org/forum_WTC/ny-dupuy.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2007); GAZZINI, 
supra note 96, at 190-97.  
177 See supra text accompanying notes 166-172. 
178 BECKER, supra note 54, at 218; see also, Jinks, supra note 153, at 84. 
179 See supra Letter S/2001/946, supra note 94; Letter S/2001/947, supra note 168; Letter S/2001/949, supra note 
169. 
180 Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J.14, 110 (June 27), at paras.109-112; Genocide Convention case, 46 I.L.M. 85, at paras. 
391-93 & 399-400.  
181 ???????Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal on Jurisdiction, at paras. 98-145; Genocide Convention case, 46 I.L.M. 85, at 
para. 403.  
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The military action, and the wide international support for the same, against the Taliban, 
as opposed to merely Al-Qaeda members and locations, can be interpreted as an example of state 
practice which equates non-state and state conduct for the purposes of responsibility.182 By 
holding the Taliban responsible for the actions of terrorists that it merely hosts on its soil (albeit 
willingly), the boundaries between public and private conduct in international law take on a 
fundamentally new shade.183 If this example of state practice and the wide opinio iuris in its 
support is to be considered as sufficient to constitute a new rule of customary international law, 
then the more radical feminists have won a battle, albeit in a manner they might themselves find 
difficult to support.184 In short, this new rule holds that states are responsible, directly 
responsible, for permitting private violations of international law to occur. Governments in such 
circumstances should anticipate the possibility of immediate repercussions against their own 
institutions, not just against the private actors who directly caused the harm.  
It takes Eric Posner, in a book review addressed to a political science audience, to point 
to the elephant in the room.  
The organizing premise [of Becker’s thesis, arguing that the Afghanistan war constitutes 
a new rule of international law] is that all states are treated the same by international 
law; the goal is to derive a universal norm from a handful of legal and historical 
precedents. Thus, Becker largely ignores the most likely scenario: that nations that 
approved of or acquiesced in the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan did so for geopolitical 
reasons and did not believe that they thereby committed themselves to a general legal 
                                               
182 International support for the military action was wide, including N.A.T.O., the O.A.S. and all the permanent 
members of the Security Council, see Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: 
Legal Regulation of Use of Force, supra note 160, at 248-49; see also GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF 
FORCE, supra note 120, at 159; BECKER, supra note 54, at 214-15; Jinks, supra note 153, at 87-89. It was not, 
however, universal, see, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: Legal 
Regulation of Use of Force, at 249.  
183 Jinks, supra note 153, at 90.  
184 Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, Sex, Gender, and September 11, 96(3) AM. J. INT’L L. 600, 605 (2002).  
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norm that permits any nation attacked by foreign terrorists – India, Israel, Russia, Iraq – 
to invade a country that harbored them, as the causation-based theory requires. It may be 
that one set of rules governs the United States and another set of rules governs other 
nations.185  
It may be too much to suppose that the law in this area is principled and coherent and that 
“all states are treated the same.”186 The United States was under enormous domestic pressure to 
make a show of force in response to an unprecedented attack on its home soil against 
predominantly United States civilians. In their rush to express outrage at the attacks and support 
for the global hegemon, much of the opinio iuris in support of the military action may have been 
too little considered. On the other hand, it seems inconceivable that states and their 
representatives were oblivious to the significance of their words and actions. World leaders may 
not be scholars of international law — they may not even be particularly interested in 
international law — but they are backed by teams of advisors who are. 
However, one should not rely too heavily on the single example of the response in 
Afghanistan to the perceived Al-Qaeda threat. Customary international law contains space for 
exceptions and this may be one such exception, especially considering the unique circumstances 
under which it was undertaken.187 It will take a great deal more state practice and opinio iuris to 
answer the age old question of customary international law: when do the exceptions become the 
norm?188  
                                               
185 Eric Posner, Book Review, 121(3) POL. SCI. Q. 505 (2006); see also GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF 
FORCE, supra note 120, at 160. 
186 Id. 
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Later military action in the “War on Terror” does not cast any new light on the question 
of state responsibility. The 2003 invasion of Iraq is of less significance in identifying the 
boundaries between public and private responsibility. At least prior to 2003, the perceived threat 
emanating from Iraq to Western democracies was from clearly identifiable public (state) actors, 
most obviously the president and members of his extended family exercising elements of 
governmental and administrative authority.189 
  
PART FOUR: UNLIKELY BEDFELLOWS, DANGEROUS BEDFELLOWS 
 
The Public/Private Divide Lives On 
 
Despite much official hand-wringing over the plight of Afghan women in the fall of 
2001, feminists would be wise to retain doubts that international law has radically changed or  is 
ready to bring women’s daily challenges to the forefront of its attention.190 The traditional 
narrow vision of the state was firmly upheld in the Genocide Convention case by the 
International Court of Justice, international law’s ultimate arbiter.191 Should it face a terrorism 
case, it is not a foregone conclusion that the Court would back an expanded notion of 
responsibility, attributing to the state terrorist activities by ostensibly private actors. They may 
                                               
189 U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4721st mtg. U.N. Doc. S/PV.4721 (Mar. 19, 2003) at 13, 15-16 & 19.  
190 President of the United States of America, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 
supra note 157; REPORT ON THE TALIBAN’S WAR AGAINST WOMEN, (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 
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FALUDI, THE TERROR DREAM: FEAR AND FANTASY IN POST-9/11 AMERICA 39-41 (New York, 2007).  
191 Genocide Convention case, 46 I.L.M. 85, (2007) (Feb. 26); for commentary, see, e.g. Sandesh Sivakumaran, 
Case Comment, 56 INT’L. & COMP. L.Q. 695 (2007); Marina Spinedi, L’attribuzione allo Stato dei comportamenti di 
gruppi armati da esso sostenuti nella sentenza della Corte internazionale di giustizia sul genocidio in Bosnia-
Erzegovina, XC RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 417 (2007).  
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consider terrorism as lex specialis; or, more likely, they would continue to rely instead on the 
Nicaragua test as they did in the Genocide Convention case.192  
It is unlikely that The Boundaries of International Law occupies space on the personal 
bookshelves of President George W. Bush, or that its contents informed his speechwriters.193 
Those most forcefully advocating an expansion of state responsibility for terrorism are not doing 
so with the feminist arguments in mind.194 Although keen to enlarge the range of state 
responsibility for terrorism and thus undermine the traditional public/private divide of 
international law, there remains a simultaneous insistence, even dependence, on the 
public/private divide by the states most deeply engaged in counter-terrorist operations and 




The state which harbors terrorists might be responsible for any international attacks that 
those terrorists carry out; but the terrorists themselves are not, according to the United States, to 
be considered agents or organs of the state in the Nicaragua or ILC Articles sense.195 The 
position of the United States is that they are to be considered, once detained, as “enemy 
combatants,” neither prisoners of war nor civilians entitled to the protections of Geneva 
Conventions III and IV respectively.196 This asymmetry operates to the benefit of the United 
                                               
192 See Genocide Convention case, 46 I.L.M. 85, (2007) (Feb. 26), at para. 401, indicating that the Court would 
require the lex specialis to be unambiguous to depart from the general secondary rules of state responsibility (quoted 
supra at note 125).  
193 CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 48. 
194 See, supra text accompanying notes 121-159. 
195 ILC Articles, supra note 1; Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J.14, 110 (June 27).  
196 John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists 8-20 (Boalt Working Papers in Public Law, Univ. of Cal., 
Berkeley, No. 25, 2003); see also, Jinks, supra note 153, at 93-94 arguing that state responsibility might actually 
require recognition of terrorists as POWs and give them immunity for their “crimes.” 
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States and its allies by legitimizing their military action as lawful under the Charter without 
requiring those same states to extend the usual protections to those detained in its course.197 
 
Private Contractors in Combat and Quasi-Combat Operations 
 
Extensive use of private contractors in the “War on Terror” in both Afghanistan and Iraq 
further reifies the public/private dichotomy to the extent that the states paying the contractors’ 
salaries will seek to exclude themselves from liability when those contractors violate either 
international law or domestic law in the state of their operations.198 It is very much in the 
interests of the states hiring the contractors to continue to insist upon a test of state responsibility 
pivoting on Articles 4, 5 and 8 of the ILC Articles, namely, the Nicaragua tests of complete 
dependence or effective control (Article 4 and 8) or the test of “exercising elements of 
governmental authority” (Article 5) to ensure that any wayward actions of the contractors will 
not be attributable to the those states.199 Further, the jurisdiction of the Iraqi domestic legal 
process has been curtailed against the same private contractors by virtue of an executive order of 
the occupying forces.200 Thus internationally unlawful actions of contractors fall into a legal 
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problem of establishing “elements of governmental authority.” 
200 Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 17 (Revised): Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Mnf - 
Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq, Section 4, para. 3, CPA/ORD/27 (June 17, 2004), available at 
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_17_Status_of_Coalition__Rev__with_Annex_A.pdf. See 
also Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or 
Civilian Employees, 5(2) CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, especially 516-17 (2005).  
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black hole; there can be no domestic legal process against the individuals or their firms, nor 
international legal process against the states which gives them license.201  
 
Private Contractors in Reconstruction and Privatization of Services 
 
As military operations take out bridges, roads, electricity, and safe water supplies, private 
contractors, predominantly United States’ companies, are engaged to restore them.202 
Furthermore, the development and maintenance of market-based economies (involving transfer 
of service sectors and infrastructure from public to private control) is itself lauded as a central 
pillar of counter-terrorism strategies as well as a necessary feature of development.203  
This is unlikely to be good news for the poorest women of Iraq or Afghanistan or to those 
engaged primarily in unpaid and unrecognized labor. Privatization of vital social services is 
translated amongst poor populations as the transfer of responsibility from the state to women’s 
backs, from paid labor to invisible unpaid family labor, “a transfer of costs from the market to 
                                               
201 See also, Peter W. Singer, Warriors for Hire, (The Brookings Institution, April 15, 2004), available at  
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2004/0415defenseindustry_singer.aspx (last visited April 7, 2009); Nils 
Rosemann, The Privatization of Human Rights Violations – Business’ Impunity or Corporate Responsibility? The 
Case of Human Rights Abuses and Torture in Iraq, 5 NON-STATE ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (2005).  
202 See SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN REPORTS TO CONGRESS (Quarterly) 
http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2009); see also U.S. Government 
International Trade Administration, Afghanistan Investment and Reconstruction Task Force 
http://www.trade.gov/afghanistan/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2009); SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ REPORTS TO 
CONGRESS (Quarterly) http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2009); see 
also U.S. Government International Trade Administration, Iraq Investment and Reconstruction Task Force 
http://trade.gov/iraq/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2009). 
203 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM, (United States of America, Washington D.C., Feb. 2003) 22-
23; George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002) 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html; George W. Bush, President of the United 
States of America, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html. 
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the household.”204 Privatization of education and health-care means less of both for the poorest 
women and girls.  
Shortly before the seismic events of 9/11, Charlesworth and Chinkin wrote:  “The two 
major challenges to all human rights, and especially to those of women, in the twenty-first 
century will be the forces of religious extremism and of economic globalization.”205 
Development in Afghanistan and redevelopment in Iraq following the usual contemporary model 
will serve to reinforce the comparative disadvantages of women and permit, even require, further 
exploitation of women’s unpaid labor.206  
 
The (Private) Place of Women 
 
Hand in hand with the liberalization of the market in the post-intervention economies 
comes the further reification of the public/private dichotomies long criticized by feminists in 
Western democracies, as women (and violence against them) are considered non-political. 
Women are effectively excluded from positions of governance in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
similarly have been largely excluded in negotiations between competing factions.207 The (male) 
                                               
204 LOURDES BENERÍA, GENDER, DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBALIZATION: ECONOMICS AS IF ALL PEOPLE MATTERED, 
49-50 (Routledge 2003). 
205 CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, , supra note 48, at 249.  
206 See, e.g., Diane Otto, Holding up Half the Sky: But for Whose Benefit? A Critical Analysis of the Fourth World 
Conference on Women 6 AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST L.J. 7 (1996); BENERÍA, supra note 204, at 47-53; Ambreena Manji, 
Remortgaging Women’s Lives: The World Bank’s Land Agenda in Africa, 11 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 139 (2003) 
especially at 147-157; Ambreena Manji, “They Beautyful Ones” of Law and Development, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
MODERN FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 8, at 159, especially at 165-168; Fiona Beveridge, Feminist 
Perspectives in International Economic Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: MODERN FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, id. at 173, 
especially at 178-81 & 189.  
207 Chinkin, et al., supra note 190, at 19; Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 184, at 602. Of the twenty ministries 
in the transitional Afghan Government (2002-2004), only 2 portfolios were held by women; human rights, and 
health. The President, five vice-presidents and five national defense commissioners were all men: Transitional 
Government of Afghanistan, AFGHANLAND.COM, http://www.afghanland.com/history/transitional.html (last visited 
Aug. 27, 2008). The current cabinet of 26 has only one, Hosn Bano Ghazanfar, with the unsurprising portfolio of 
women’s affairs: The Cabinet, (Office of the President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan), 
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self-declared leaders are presumed to speak for all and women’s rights become a matter of 
relative cultural values.208 This is self-determination of a highly selective “self.” Violence against 
women qua women is considered a matter of domestic law, and when domestic process fails to 
take it seriously, no questions are raised by the state’s allies about the legitimacy of the 
government or its sovereign inviolability.209 Despite changes in the language of state 
responsibility, little has changed for women since the “liberation” of Kuwait from the oppressive 
Iraqi invader in 1991, after which Kuwaiti women remained disenfranchised from the electoral 
process and foreign women found themselves targets of sexual violence by Kuwaiti men, often 
ostensibly under color of state authority.210  
 
Masculinity and the “War on Terror” 
 
Finally, the discourse of the “War on Terror” itself revealed a perceived need for the state 
to define its masculinity in the aftermath of attack. This required painting men as heroes and 
women as victims.211 Chinkin and Charlesworth described the media responses in the immediate 
aftermath in which women featured as heavenly rewards for terrorists or as victims of the attack, 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.president.gov.af/english/cabinet.mspx (last visited Aug. 27, 2008). The interim Iraqi Government (2003-
2005) of 37 included 6 women, all in junior roles: Sharon Otterman, Iraq: The Interim Government Leaders, 
(Council of Foreign Relations, June 2, 2004), http://www.cfr.org/publication/7664/#1. The post 2006 election Iraqi 
Government has portfolios for 4 women, namely environment, housing, health and women’s affairs Member’s of 
Iraq’s Government, (Education for Peace in Iraq Center, May 1, 2007), http://ww2.epic-
usa.org/files/EPIC/IRAQ_Government.pdf. 
208 When pressed on the question of women’s rights, the U.S. response was “Right now we have other priorities,” 
see FALUDI, supra note 190, at 41. 
209 Afghanistan: “One Month in Afghanistan: A Step Backwards for Women in Afghanistan,” (Women Under 
Muslim Laws, June 20. 2007), http://www.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd%5B157%5D=x-157-554302; 
IRAQ: WOMEN’S RIGHTS UNDER ATTACK: OCCUPATION, CONSTITUTION AND FUNDAMENTALISMS, (Women Under 
Muslim Laws, Occasional Paper, No. 15, 2006).  
210 CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 48, at 262.  
211 Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 184; Shelley Wright, The Horizon of Becoming: Culture, Gender and 
History after September 11, 71 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 215, 245 (2002), comparing the collapse of the twin towers to a 
castration, feeding a need for the American state to reclaim its virility. See also, CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra 
note 48, at 137-39; see also FALUDI, supra note 190, at 46-64 & 89-115.  
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preferably widows of murdered men, rather than the women who themselves worked daily in the 
twin towers or in the rescue services.212 Women in the armed services and firefighting teams 
were conspicuous by their invisibility.213 Women in Afghanistan are depicted as victims of a 
brutal Taliban, requiring rescue by heroic (Western) men – though not political participation.214 
The suffering women endure under the airpower of those same Western forces and the hardship 
encountered as essential services are put beyond their use are unfortunate “collateral damage” — 
a sacrifice for their greater long-term good.215 Susan Faludi’s 2007 investigative retrospect of the 
media in the aftermath of 9/11 provides thorough confirmation of the Australians’ early 
impressions.216 In such times, a feminist perspective of the state that seeks women’s 




Ultimately, being conceived female constitutes a much greater threat to one’s survival 
and level of well-being than the threat of terrorist attacks.218 On reflection, the counter-terrorism 
strategies and rhetoric considered more broadly indicate that this stark fact is likely to remain so 
for some time to come.  
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